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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
gress adopt some code or policy which will protect the rights of witnesses
and demonstrate that "legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties
and welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as the courts." 50
DISCRETIONARY ACTS OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES
UNDER THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
The enactment of the Federal Tort Claims Act' on August 2, 1946, swept
away in broad language the immunity of the Government to suits in tort.
The Act states that the government shall be liable in money damages only
for ".... injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death, caused by
the negligent or wrongful act, or omission of any employee of the govern-
ment while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under
circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable
to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or
omission occurred."'2
The tort obligation of the United States became actual instead of moral.
Injured parties were given resort to the courts in lieu of the former method
of a petition to Congress which that legislature at its option and in its be-
nevolence could have responded to by the granting of relief in a private
bill.3
Government growth and spread into new fields had made federal con-
mony at a televised congressional hearing. On August to, 1951, the United States
Senate voted 38 to 13 to certify these men to the United States Attorney for the
District of Columbia as being in contempt of that body. 97 Cong. Rec. 100 13 (August
10, 1951). However a reading of the Senate debate which preceded the balloting indi-
cates that both Senators Kefauver and O'Conor were of the opinion that television
was involved in neither of these instances because the committee chairman, when
the witnesses refused to testify, offered to discontinue focusing the television cameras
on them. This position, however, seems subject to serious queston because the cameras
had been on the witnesses for about half an hour at the time of the offer and the
focusing of the cameras on some other participant in the hearings would continue
to permit the replies of the witnesses to be audible to the television audience.
50 Missouri, K. & T. Rv. Co. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270 (1903). Many have ex-
pressed the opinion that Congress should be permitted to conduct its investigations
as it sees fit with little or no interference from the courts. For example see Frankfurter,
Hands Off The Investigations, 38 New Rep. 329 (1925); Jackson J. dissenting in
Eisler v. United States, 338 U.S. i89, 196 (1949).
1 6o Stat. 843 (946). New title: 6z Star. 992 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A. SS 1346(b), 1402,
1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, 2671-268o (1948).
262 Stat. 933 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(b) (1948).
a The Special Senate Committee which reported on Title IV of the Legislative
Reorganization Bill of 1946 stated: "It [the Federal Tort Claims Act] is comple-
mentary to the provision in title I banning private bills and resolutions in Congress,
leaving claimants to their remedy under this title [the Act]." Sen. Rep. No. 1400(on S. 2177), 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1946).
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tacts with private parties infinitely more numerous. Congress has always
realized that governmental immunity to suit in tort was masking many
wrongs committed by federal employees and, that a petition for relief was
not only unsatisfactory and inadequate, but burdensome and time-con-
suming on the part of the legislature. 4 As an attempted solution Congress
waived by this Act the immunity to suits for torts and placed jurisdiction
in the district courts to hear tort claims against the United States.5
There are, however, several express exceptions" to the government's
waiver of immunity. These exceptions leave the tort liability of the gov-
ernment something considerably less than that of "a private person...
liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the
act or omission occurred."7
One of the most significant of these exceptions, the one which is the sub-
ject of this comment, is Section 268o(a), which states:
The provisions... [making the government liable for torts] ... shall not apply
to-(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the govern-
ment exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether
or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or per-
formance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty
on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the government, whether or
not the discretion involved be abused.8
The legislative intent behind the exception is apparent: whenever an act
is discretionary on the part of a federal employee, no tort action will lie
for his choice in performing it one way rather than another.9 The courts
are at great pains to carry out this intent,10 and quickly dismiss cases in-
volving discretionary acts by saying they are without jurisdiction.11
One problem presented by the "discretionary function or duty" excep-
tion is how broadly the exception is to be construed. Although the Govern-
ment as a matter of defense has argued that statutes waiving sovereign im-
4 See comment in note 3 supra.
56z Stat. 933 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A. S 1346(b) (1948).
6 6o Stat. 845, 846 (1946), as amended ,8 U.S.C.A. §§ 2671-268o (1948).
7 See text 1o.
862 Stat. 984 (1948), z8 U.S.C.A. S 268o (a) (948).
9 "It is neither desirable nor intended that . . . the propriety of a discretionary
administrative act, be tested through the medium of a damage suit for tort." Hearings
before House Committee on the Judiciary on the changes made in H.R. Rep. No.
5373 by H.R. Rep. No. 6463, 77th Cong. zd Sess. 44 (1942).
10E.g., Toledo v. United States, 95 F. Supp. 838 (P.R., 1951); Coates v. United
States, 181 F. 2d 816 (C.A. 8th, 195o). Both quote the language cited in note 9 supra.
Also Yellow Cab v. United States, 340 U.S. 543 (951), which quotes the legislative
reports on the Federal Tort Claims Act at great length.
11 This is the disposition made of cases falling within the "discretionary function"
exception. E.g., Thomas v. United States, 81 F. Supp. 881 (W.D. Mo., 1949); Old
King Coal Co. v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 124 (S.D. Iowa, 1949).
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munity must be strictly construed in favor of the Government, 12 the Su-
preme Court has stated that "when authority [waiving immunity] is given,
it is liberally construed. 13
Liberal construction of the Act in favor of claimants is the more logical
test for the courts in determining jurisdiction, as the broad language of the
Act indicates,14 and the courts have admitted.15 It would seem to follow
that the specifically enumerated exceptions in a general statutory waiver
of sovereign immunity should be strictly construed against the Govern-
ment.' The courts, however, show definite reluctance to construe these
exceptions, especially the "discretionary function" exception in a manner
favorable to the claimant.' 7 While admitting that a construction of the
"discretionary function" exception to include all acts of government em-
ployees involving any discretion would defeat the purpose of the Act,'"
the courts are unwilling to probe into the situations normally recognized
as involving official discretion. Indeed, the judicial opinions say the excep-
tion is a clear instance of an area of governmental activity where Congress
intcnded no waiver of immunity.19 Section 2680 is construed as being re-
strictive on the over-all scope of the Act, not to be nullified by liberality
of construction.20
The courts are justified, perhaps, in refusing to test discretionary acts
of federal employees, for Congress made clear its intent that the propriety
of discretionary acts was not to be subject to the Act, even though the dis-
cretion be abused.21 The existence of discretion in the employee is suffi-
cient to make the wisdom or reasonableness of his action immune from
judicial scrutiny.' 2 Congress evidently realized many injuries would occur
12 United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543 ('951).
13 Ibid., at 555 quoting as applicable to the Federal Tort Claims Act Judge Car-
dozo's statement in Anderson v. John L. Hayes Construction Co., 243 N.Y. 14o, 147,
153 N.E. z8, 29-30 (1926).
14 See text at note i supra. For a detailed analysis of the terms of the Act and
its history, see Gottlieb, The Federal Tort Claims Act-A Statutory Interpretation,
35 Geo. .J. 1 (1946).
15 Authorities cited in note 1o supra. Contra: Kendrick v. United States, 8, F. Supp.
430 (N.D. Ala., 1949).
16 In interpreting Section z68o, the courts do not go by any rule of construction
generally, other than determining legislative intent. See authorities cited in note 1o
supra.
17 E.g., Coates v. United States, 18i F. 2d 816 (C.A. 8th, 195o); Toledo v. United
States, 9S F. Supp. 838 (P.R., 1951).
Is Toledo v. United States, 95 F. Supp. 838 (P.R., '95').
19Coates v. United States, 181 F. 2d 8M6 (C.A. 8th, 1950); Oman v. United States,
179 F. 2d 738 (C.A. ioth, 1949).
20 E.g., Toledo v. United States, 95 F. Supp. 838, 840 (P.R., 1951).
21 See comment in note 9 supra.
22 "The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, not
to inquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which they have
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from unreasonably exercised discretion, but as the lesser of two evils pre-
ferred these wrongs to go unremedied rather than risk the curtailment of
the freedom of choice of action by federal employees because of their fear
of litigation in which their exercise of discretion might be subjected to
criticism. The purpose of the exception, then, is to allow free exercise of
discretion by federal employees, thus allowing them to act efficiently and
unhampered by any such concern.
An examination of the cases reveals various instances where the courts
have ruled on the nature of acts done by federal employees. In Denny v.
United States23 the army medical service failed to dispatch promptly an
ambulance for the pregnant wife of an officer, and as a result her child was
still-born. The applicable army regulation stated that medical attendance
was to be afforded officers' wives whenever practicable. The court dis-
missed the suit saying the obligation of the government to furnish medical
service was clearly discretionary, and any negligent breach in failing to
extend prompt service was not actionable under the Act.
The same court in Costley v. United States24 allowed recovery when a
master sergeant's wife was admitted to the maternity section of an army
hospital and mistakenly administered a harmful drug instead of a spinal
anesthetic, causing permanent paralysis. The court distinguished the Denny
case, saying that in the Costley case the employees were not exercising a
discretionary function because they had already exercised it in admitting
Mrs. Costley to the hospital and undertaking her delivery. Thereafter they
were under a duty to attend and treat her, and no longer had any discretion
with regard to her careful treatment. In these two cases the court draws
a rough line and says that once the discretion is exercised, the performance
of the particular course of action decided upon is within the scope of the
Act, and if carried out without due care can be the basis for recovery
thereunder. 25
This also seems to be the rule followed in Hambleton v. United States,26
where a sergeant in the Criminal Investigation Department grilled a woman
unnecessarily long and in a harsh manner and she suffered a mental collapse.
The court said that after he had exercised his discretion as to whether or
not to interrogate Mrs. Hambleton, and decided to do so, he was bound
to apply reasonable, prudent methods, use due and ordinary care, and to
refrain from excessive grilling.
a discretion. Questions in their nature political, or which are, by the Constitution
and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court." Chief Justice
Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, i Cranch (U.S.) 137, 170 (1803), quoted as applicable
to Section z68o in Coates v. United States, 18f F. 2d 816, 818 (C.A. 8th, 1950).
23 171 F. 2d 365 (C.A. 5th, 1948).
24 181 F. 2d 723 (C.A. 5th, 1950).
25 Cf. Griggs v. United States, 178 F. 2d , (C.A. toth, 1949).
26 87 F. Supp. 995 (W.D. Wash., 1949).
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In Coates v. United States27 the plaintiff sought damages for injury to his
land and crops due to the alleged negligence of certain federal agencies
in changing the course of the Missouri River and creating a new water-
way.28 The court said that the choice by the agencies of a method to be
used to create the waterway was discretionary, and no action could lie for
negligence in deciding on any particular method. Significantly, the court
pointed out that the complaint could not be interpreted as charging negli-
gence in a mere job of work involved in carrying out the river project. 29
Had the complaint stated that the method decided upon was being carried
out in a negligent manner, the court probably would not have dismissed
the suit as falling within the "discretionary function" exception. Instead,
the court refused to go beyond the complaint to assume jurisdiction, and
sustained the trial court's dismissal.30
Toledo v. United States,3 ' one of the most recent decisions that a claim
was within the "discretionary function" exception of the Act, is somewhat
confusing. In this case plaintiff parked his car in the parking lot of an ex-
perimental station maintained by the United States Department of Agri-
culture. His auto was damaged when a tree infected with internal rot fell
upon it. Since the tree was part of an experimental research program, the
court felt that the course to be pursued in experimenting with the tree was
a matter within the discretion of the station employees. Until the discretion
had been exercised as to whether to continue research on the tree or to
remove it, no action would lie for failure to remove it. The court could
just as logically have taken jurisdiction on the ground that the complaint
spelled out a charge of experimentation in a negligent manner, and tried
the case on its merits. But after pointing out that the internal rot was
almost impossible to detect from an external examination, 82 the court dis-
missed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The case illustrates a strict
construction in favor of the Government, which, as has been noted above,
seems to be the general practice of the courts when considering Section
z68o(a). 83
27 181 F. ,d 816 (C.A. 8th, 195o).
28 Accord: Thomas v. United States, 81 F. Supp. 881 (W.D. Mo., 1949); Olson v.
United States, 93 F. Supp. 150 (N.D., 1951); Boyce v. United States, 93 F. Supp.
866 (E.D. Iowa, 1951). But cf. North Dakota v. Przybylski, 98 F. Supp. 18 (Nev.,
1951), distinguished from the Coates case because the plaintiff had already got a
court order restraining the Bureau of Indian Affairs from the act complained of.
29 181 F. 2d 816, 819 (C.A. 8th, 1950).
30 Ibid., at 82o.
31 95 F. Supp. 838 (P.R., 1951).
32 Some courts show a tendency to further justify dismissal of a case as within Sec-
tion 268o by saving the case on its merits does not make out tortious conduct. Cf.
Kendrick v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 430 (N.D. Ala., 1949) (mental patient released
from government hospital killed plaintiff's intestate); Sickman v. United States,
184 F. 2d 616 (C.A. 7th, 1950) (plaintiff's crops damaged by migratory waterfowl
which were protected by federal game laws).
83 See comments in notes 9 and io supra.
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The question as to when an act is discretionary rather than ministerial,
or an absolute duty,3 4 can be answered only by examination of the applica-
ble statutes and the particular facts of each case. 35 Although the exact
limits of the "discretionary function or duty" exception are as yet un-
charted by the courts, the cases indicate that the courts are aware of the
manifest intent of Congress to pay for the negligent performance of rou-
tine duties by federal employees, but just as importantly not to inhibit the
action of employees exercising genuine executive discretion and responsi-
bility, and the courts are determined to carry out that intent.
MORALITY UNDER NATURALIZATION AND
IMMIGRATION ACTS
Few topics have caused more consternation and discussion throughout
the history of man than the problem of right and wrong. Legal scholars
and commentators have been in the thick of this controversy. The question
was highlighted by Chief Justice Vinson of the United States Supreme
Court, when in a recent case he stated: "Nothing is more certain in modern
society than the principle that there are no absolutes."' This theory might
evoke surprise among lay people, but it should be no stranger to lawyers. 2
Such a view, far from being an idle bit of philosophical by-play,3 has a
direct and vital effect upon two of the most important pieces of federal
legislation: the Naturalization Act and the Immigration Act.
The Naturalization Act makes one desiring to become a citizen prove
that he has been "a person of good moral character" during the five years
a
4 Costley v. United States, 181 F. zd 723 (C.A. 5 th, 195o); State of Maryland v.
Manor Real Estate and Trust Co., 176 F. 2d 414 (C.A. 4th, 1949) (F.H.A. had absolute,
not discretionary, duty to safeguard health of tenants); Oman v. United States, 179 F.
2d 738 (C.A. ioth, 1949). (No government employee is granted the discretion to
induce third parties to interfere with exclusive grazing privileges granted by the
United States.)
35 E.g., Old King Coal Co. v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 124 (S.D. Iowa, 1949)
(Secretary of the Interior took over operation of a coal mine under an Executive
Order empowering him to run it in such manner as he deemed necessary in the
interest of the war effort. Held, that the power was discretionary).
1 Dennis et al. v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 508 (1951).
2 "It is no longer news that law has lost its connection with philosophy. In place
of its traditional foundations of morals and metaphysics it now rests either on some
pragmatic expendiency or on an historic evolution evidenced by custom, or it is
deemed to consist of nothing but facts and therefore rests on no basis at all."
McKinnon, Law and Philosophy, z6 Can. Bar Rev. 1045 (1948).
s "We have arrived at the point historically where we can no longer proceed with
any health or happiness on the blithe assumption that it doesn't matter what any of
us believe-or whether there is really anything to believe." This quotation is from
a speech delivered by Henry R. Luce, editor-in-chief of Time, Life and Fortune
magazines, at the opening of Southern Methodist University's new legal center. A full
text of the speech can be found in 43 Fortune, No. 6, at 85 (June, 195).
